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NOTES
Eminent Domain: Ohio Evidentiary Aspects
in Ascertaining Market Value
EMINENT DOMAIN

has been defined as the taking, without the

owner's consent of private property for public use upon a making of just compensation.' In recent years, myriad public improvement projects have resulted in the appropriation of billions of dollars of private property and in voluminous litigation. The law of
eminent domain inherently involves a direct conflict between the
owner of the property taken (condemnee) and the state or other
governmental agency (condemnor) as to the proper valuation of
such property. The conflict typically arises in the following manner: The condemnee generally alleges that the valuation does not
constitute the "just compensation' ' to which he is constitutionally
entitled, whereas the condemnor alleges that such determination
indeed reflects the true value of the property. The conflict is resolved in a condemnation proceeding where generally the only issue involved is the amount of compensation to be awarded to the
condemnee. The proceeding centers around a controversy as to either the elements of value or the evidentiary procedures by which
these elements are translated into a monetary value.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the evidentiary aspects
of an Ohio condemnation proceeding where there has been a complete appropriation of the condemnee's property. The analysis will
encompass (1) the meaning of the terms "just compensation" and
"fair market value"; (2) a discussion of those items of evidence
which the Ohio courts have deemed to be admissible in ascertaining
the value of the appropriated property; and (3) a discussion of those
items which have been specifically excluded because they do not aid
in ascertaining the value of the land.
I.

MEANING OF "JUST COMPENSATION"

Both the United States and Ohio Constitutions provide that an
owner of private property is entitled to receive "just compensation"
if his property is taken for public use.' In construing the term "just
1 1 NICHOLs, EMIMENT DoMAIN § 1.11, at 7 (rev. 3d ed. 1964).

2E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; see OHIO CONST. art I, § 19, art XIII, § 5.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public
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compensation," the courts have been reluctant to define it or to prescribe definite standards as to its application. In United States v.
Cors,4 for example, the Supreme Court stated: "The Court in its
construction of the constitutional provision has been careful not to
reduce the concept of 'just compensation' to a formula... [T~he
Amendment does not contain any definite standards of fairness by
which the measure of just compensation is to be determined." ' Although Cors emphasized that the term is incapable of exact definition,6 the Supreme Court in numerous other instances has defined
the term to mean the fair market value of the property.7
Generally, the Ohio courts have held that the amount of compensation to which a landowner is entitled upon appropriation of
his property is its fair market value.8 However, it is imperative to
note that "market value" is not an end in itself, but merely a means
used in ascertaining "just compensation."9 Thus, it appears that
use, without just compensation." OHIo CoNsT. art I, § 19 provides: "Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.... [W]here
private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation thereof shall first be
made in money... and such compensation shall be assessed by a jury ....
" See also
OHIO CoNsT. art XIII, § 5. I-n
re Appropriation of Basements for Highway Purposes,
118 Ohio App. 285, 194 N.E.2d 151 (1963) held that "the word 'compensation' [as
used in OHIo CONST. art. I, § 19) is the equivalent of the term 'just compensation' in
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 287, 194 N.E.2d at 153.
4 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
51d. at 332.
6ibid.
7 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338

U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States
v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S.
341 (1923). In United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949), the Supreme Court recognized that generally "market value" is synonymous with "just compensation" but held
that this is not a universal rule by stating:
The Court in an endeavor to find working rules that will do substantial justice has adopted practical standards, including that of market value.... But
it has refused to make a fetish even of market value, since that may not be
the best measure of value in some cases. At times some elements included
in the criterion of market value have in fairness been excluded, as for example where the property has a special value to the owner because of its adaptability to his needs or where it has a special value to the taker because of
its peculiar fitness for the taker's project Id. at 332.
SMuskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist. v. Funk, 134 Ohio St. 302, 16 N.E.2d
454 (1938); Giesy v. Cincinnati W. & Z. Ry., 4 Ohio St. 308 (1854); Naftzger v. State,
24 Ohio App. 183, 156 NE. 614 (1927).
9E.g., City of Cleveland v. Langenau Mfg. Co., 128 N.E.2d 130 (Ohio Ct. App.
1954); cf. City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963).
In Housing Authority v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga. App. 881, 87
S.E.2d 671 (1955) the court stated:
[While market value is the general yardstick in a condemnation proceeding or a suit for compensation in the nature of a condemnation proceeding,
there may be circumstances in which market value and actual value are not
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"just compensation" is the "fair market value" of the land unless
the facts and circumstances of the particular case indicate that the
property has no market value or that the use of market value would
be prejudicial or result in an "unjust compensation."
Although the general rule is that the measure of compensation
is the fair market value of the land, the court still must determine
what is meant by the term "market value." Generally, it has been
defined as the price a purchaser who is willing but not obliged to
buy the property would pay to an owner who is willing but not
obliged to sell the property, considering all the uses to which the
land was adapted and might reasonably be applied.1" In Sowers v.
SchaeHer," the Ohio Supreme Court, recognizing that the measure
of compensation is the market value of the property, stated:
"[Iln determining the amount of compensation, or the market
value of the property taken, each case must be considered in the
light of its own facts, and every element which can fairly enter
into the question of value, and which an ordinarily prudent business man would consider before forming a judgment in making a
purchase, should be considered."' 2
Another recent decision," emphasizing that only such facts are admissible, held that the trial court had committed prejudicial error
in instructing the jury to consider every element "which would influence any intended purchaser's estimate of the market value of
such property."' 4 Therefore, it appears that the Ohio courts would
admit all those items which an owner would stress upon a buyer
with whom he is negotiating a sale, excluding only those items
the same, and in such event the jury may consider the actual value of the

land or interest therein appropriated. Id. at 885-86,87 S.E2d at 676.
104 NiCHOLS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 12.2 [1], at 48-54. For a similar definition

by the Ohio Supreme Court, see Preston v. Stover Leslie Eying Serv., Inc., 174 Ohio
St. 441, 450, 190 N.E.2d 446, 452 (1963).

11155 Ohio St 454, 99 N.E2d 313 (1951).
12MId. at 459, 99 N.E.2d at 317, quoting from 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 136

(5), at 555-57 (1965).

(Emphasis added.)

Masheter v. Yake, 9 Ohio App. 2d 327,224 N.E2d 540 (1967).
14Id. at 331, 224 N.E.2d at 543. The court stated:
3.

Nor is market value, or damages, determined by the influence these elements would have on any intended purchaser. Some prospective purchasers

would be influenced or react differently to such elements than would others,
even to the extent of being arbitrary. A nervous person might not be able to
stand noise, whereas a deaf person would not be bothered. A childless or
bold person would not fear the proximity of fast moving traffic to the extent that a timid person or one with several young children would. A per-

son having no car would not be as concerned about access to his property as
would a person owning a car. The test of influence or consideration relates
not to any intended purchaser but to an ordinarily prudent business man.
Id. at 332, 224 NE.2d at 543.
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which an ordinarily prudent businessman would not consider if he
were purchasing the property.
The application of the "voluntary seller - willing prudent
buyer" test to ascertain "just compensation" is seemingly a legal
fiction, since in reality the sale is a forced sale. Further, since land
is deemed unique, the application of such a test without considering the bargaining power of the specific individuals involved is
wholly imaginary. However, since no better system has been devised, market value continues to be the recognized measure of compensation when land is appropriated by eminent domain.
Therefore, in a condemnation proceeding, the court is faced with
the difficult task of admitting that evidence which would as fairly
and accurately as possible represent the market value of the condemned land, while excluding that evidence which is either misleading to the jury or which the fictitious prudent buyer would consider as merely "puffing" on the part of the seller. An analysis of
the admissible and excludable items, as so deemed by the Ohio
courts when attempting to establish the market value of a parcel
of land, will clarify the term "just compensation" and illustrate
whether or not it has been received by the condemnee.
II.

ASCERTAINING MARKET VALUE

Generally, any evidence competent under the general rules of
evidence and relevant to the question of value is admissible."5 In
Ohio, admission of evidence rests upon the sound discretion of the
trial court."8 It would be mere speculation to specifically enumerate those items which are admissible and those items which are excluded in establishing the market value of condemned property in
any given case.. 7 However, some elements, if properly presented,
have been universally held to be admissible by the Ohio courts as
tending to establish the market value of the appropriated property.
15See, e.g., Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Ellis, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E.2d 391
(1955), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 806 (1956); Muskingum Watershed Conservancy
Dist. v. Funk, 134 Ohio St. 302, 16 N.E.2d 454 (1938); In re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes, 93 Ohio App. 179, 112 N.E.2d 411, dismissed sub nom.
Baron v. Kaver, 158 Ohio St. 285, 109 N.E.2d 3 (1952); Naftzger v. State, 24 Ohio
App. 183, 156 N.E. 614 (1927).
16Noble v. Flowers, 108 Ohio App. 1, 160 N.E.2d 383 (1959), where the court
stated: "It must be remembered that the admission or rejection of evidence in appropriation proceedings is primarily a matter of discretion with the trial court, and reviewing courts have been loathe, in the absence of abuse of that discretion, to tamper with
the results." Id. at 3, 160 N.E.2d at 385.
17

See ibid.
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Highest and Best Use

A.

The Ohio courts have held that market value does not depend
upon the present use or any particular use of the land by the owner,
but rather is arrived at by considering the best and most profitable use to which the property can reasonably and practically be
adapted.'" Thus, in Sowers v. Schaeffer"9 the Ohio Supreme Court
stated that "in estimating the value of property in an appropriation
proceeding, it must be valued as to its worth generally, not for any
particular use but for any and all uses for which it may be suitable."2 The Schaeffer case has been construed very liberally, as
evidenced by the case of Ellis v.Ohio Turnpike Commn,2 ' where
the Ohio Supreme Court held that a landowner was permitted to
show a particularuse of the property as distinguished from a general
use by stating that "evidence tending to show a particular use was
admissible because in logic and reason the highest and best use of
the property cannot be shown without giving one or more particular uses for which it is available." 2 Therefore, it appears that the
landowner can show any and all uses for which his property is suitable, but is not prohibited from showing a particular use which may
be the most profitable. The adoption of such a test prevents the
property owner from being economically penalized for using his
land in a manner which is not the most profitable economic use.
Furthermore, the fact that the owner is prohibited by a restrictive covenant in his deed from using the property in a certain manner does not prevent him from showing that such prohibited use
is the best and most valuable use to which the property is suitable.2"
18

See text accompanying notes 19-22 infra.

10 155 Ohio St. 454, 99 N.E.2d 313 (1951).
20 Id. at 458, 99 N.E.2d at 317. See also Board of County Comm'rs v. Thormyer,
169 Ohio St. 291, 159 N.E.2d 612 (1959); Cincinnati & S. Ry. v. Executor of Long-

worth, 30 Ohio St. 108 (1876); Goodin v. Cincinnati & Whitewater Canal Co., 18
Ohio St. 169 (1868). In Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934) the Supreme
Court stated:
The sum required to be paid the owner does not depend upon the uses to
which he has devoted his land but is to be arrived at upon just consideration
of all the uses for which it is suitable. The highest and most profitable use
for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the

reasonably near future is to be considered, not necessarily as the measure of
value, but to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects
the market value while the property is privately held. Id. at 255.
21 124 N.B.2d 441 (Ohio Ct.App. 1955).
22 Id. at 446.
23 In Board of County Comm'rs v. Thormyer, 169 Ohio St. 291, 159 N.E.2d 612
(1959), evidence pertaining to the value of the land for commercial purposes was admitted even though the county commissioners held title to such land under a deed
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It therefore appears that in ascertaining market value, the best and
most valuable use to which the land can reasonably and practically
"be applied is the proper measure of compensation, and neither the
present use nor any specific limitation of the owner as to the use
or disposition of his property can diminish such compensation.
Inherent in the definition of the "highest and best use" rule of
valuation are the limitations upon it."4 It appears that, for the rule
to be applicable, .the landowner must first show that the property
is adaptable to another use and that there is a reasonable probability that the property could be put to such use in the foreseeable future.25 The 1882 case of Trustees of Cincinnati So. Ry. v. Garrard26 aptly summed up the limitations of the highest and best use
rule of valuation by stating:
Real estate, being immovable, cannot be taken to market; the market must be taken to it; and therefore the question is not, merely,
fitness for use, but taking it where it is, the probabilities of its
being wanted. Being a question of present value, the wants to be
considered are those of the present; the probabilities of the future
are not to be taken into account, except as they would affect the
present. Being the value as between seller and buyer today, it is to
be -viewed in its condition and27surroundingsto-day, the same as it
would be by buyers and sellers

Thus, if an ordinarily prudent buyer would consider the proposed
use as affecting the present market value of the land, it appears that
which prevented them from selling or using the property for any purpose other than
a children's home. The Ohio Supreme Court held that such evidence was admissible,
stating that if the donor had foreseen an appropriation of the property, he would not
have wanted the state to benefit from the deed restrictions by enabling it to appropriate the property for less than it was worth. Id. at 300, 159 N.E.2d at 618.
2 In United States v. Cooper, 277 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1960), for example, the Government alleged that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to value the land as a
potential dam site where the condemnee offered no proof that there was a reasonable
probability that the land would be used as a dam by anyone other than the federal government. In reversing the district court, the court of appeals held that "in addition to
proof that the land offered a site on which it would be practicable to build a dam... it
was incumbent on the plaintiffs to prove that there was also a reasonable likelihood
that it would be so used in the reasonably near future." Id. at 859. (Emphasis omitted.)
See also Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256-57 (1934); Sowers v. Schaeffer, 155
Ohio St. 454, 99 N.E.2d 313 (1951).
25
City of Columbus v. Zanes, 120 Ohio App. 229, 201 N.E.2d 837 (1964). The
court stated:
In determining the market value of this easement taken, you should consider the highest and best use for the property at the time of the taking of
the easement and in the reasonably foreseeable future... However, merely
possible use of the property many years in the future is too speculative and
should not be considered. Id. at 232, 201 N.E.2d at 839.
26 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 389 (Ohio C.P. 1882).
27Id. at 391. (Emphasis added.)

19671

MARKET VALUE IN EMINENT DOMAIN

1693

such proposed use would be admissible. However, if such buyer
would consider the use as not being reasonably probable, but merely
of speculative or imaginary value, it appears that evidence of such
use would be inadmissible. The test as to whether a proposed use
is admissible seems to be whether such use would actually influence
the price an ordinarily prudent businessman would be willing to
pay for the condemned land.
B.

Date of Valuation

Another element which must be considered prior to computing
market value is the date on which the property should be valued.
In Director of Highways v. Olrich,8 the Supreme Court of Ohio
enunciated the general rule that property is valued as of the date
of the trial unless there has been a prior taking, in which event
compensation is determined as of the time of that taking.29
Prior to the adoption of the Ohio Uniform Eminent Domain
Act,"° .the Ohio courts had held that a taking occurred when there
had been an entry upon the land either manifesting an intent to
exercise dominion over the property3 or substantially interfering
with the owner's right to use or enjoy the property. 32 It appears
that a physical entry upon the land is required, and whether or not
a particular entry will constitute a taking often involves a difficult
factual determination."8 The Uniform Act does not afford a solution to the problem since it permits the agency to enter for the purpose of making surveys, soundings, drillings, appraisals, and examinations." However, it does provide .that the court shall enter an
order granting possession of the property to the agency only after
the agency either pays the amount of the award to the property
owner or deposits such amount with the court.35 Therefore, it
appears that under the act there will not be deemed a taking un5 Ohio St. 2d 70, 213 N.E.2d 823 (1966).
See also Nichols v. City of Cleveland, 104 Ohio
St. 19, 135 N.E. 291 (1922); Thormyer v. Joseph Evans Ice Cream Co., 167 Ohio St.
463, 150 N.E.2d 30 (1958).
30 OIO REv. CODE §§ 163.01-.22 (Supp. 1966). For a discussion of the relevant
portions of the act, see Note, Ohio's Uniform Eminent Domain Act: Transfer of Title
and Possession, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 525 (1966).
81
Cincinnati v. Smallwood, 106 Ohio App. 496, 150 N.E.2d 310 (1958) (dictum).
32 See Thormyer v. Joseph Evans Ice Cream Co., 167 Ohio St. 463, 150 N.E.2d 30
(1958).
3 Ibid.
28

29 Id. at 72, 213 N.E.2d at 825.

34 Omo REv. CODE § 163.03 (Supp. 1966).
5

3 OMIO REV. CODE § 163.15 (Supp. 1966).
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less the court grants an order to such effect, and, in the absence of
such order, the property will be valued as of the date of trial.
There are exceptions to the general rule, however, as illustrated
8 where the city adopted an urban
by City of Cleveland v. Carcione,"
renewal plan in the area of appellant's property. The city notified
all area residents of the plan and proceeded to raze the buildings
as it acquired tide to the land. When appellant's property was appraised, the jury was instructed to value the property as of the date
of trial, at which time many of the buildings were delapidated and
vandalized. The court held that due to the facts and circumstances
of the case, the property should be valued at a date prior to the
initiation of the urban renewal project which depreciated the value
of the property." Although the court recognized the rule that,
unless there is a prior taking, the property is to be valued as of the
date of trial, 8 it refused to apply such rule by stating in effect that
the facts and circumstances of the case should determine the valuation so as to assure the condemnee of receiving "just compensation"
as required by the Ohio Constitution." Although the reasoning of
the Carcione case is based upon the practical considerations of fairness and expediency, the Ohio Supreme Court in the Qirich case
limited Carcione to its facts and reaffirmed the traditional rule that
valuation
is determined at the time of trial unless there is a prior
40
taking.

However, in City of Akron v. Alexander,4 the trial court had
refused to grant appellant's request to have the jury view the premises despite statutory language to the contrary.4" The court reasoned that the rights of the property owner would be prejudiced
because of the substantial depreciation in value of the surrounding
area since the inception of an urban renewal project. It therefore
held that a view of the premises by the jury is not evidence, but
rather is used solely to enable the jurors to better understand the
evidence offered by the parties.48 Furthermore, the court stated
that
86 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963).
Id. at 533, 190 N.E.2d at 57.
881d. at 532, 190 N.E.2d at 57.
39 Ibid.
40 Director of Highways v. Olrich, 5 Ohio St. 2d 70, 74, 213 N.E.2d 823, 826
(1966).
415 Ohio St. 2d 75, 214 N.E.2d 89 (1966).
42
Omo REV. CODE § 719.10.
48 5 Ohio St. 2d at 77, 214 N.E.2d at 91.
37
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where the view would cause an injustice to the property owner and
deprive him of compensation to which he is entitled, and where
the evidence of valuation is not alleged to be complex or unclear,
the legislative purpose would not be served in granting a view of
the premises.44

Thus, an analysis of Carcione, Alexander, and Oirich demonstrates that condemned property should be valued as of the date of
trial unless there has been a prior taking or unless the facts and
circumstances are such that valuing the property as of the date of
trial would be prejudicial to the owner. It should be noted that a
corollary to this rule is that the fair market value of the property
cannot be enhanced by the value of the public improvement
This
is only equitable, for the owner should not be permitted to obtain
an economic windfall.
Ill.

A.

COMPUTING MARKET VALUE

Comparable Sales

There is a conflict of authority as to whether the sales price of
land similar to that being appropriated is admissible to show that
land's market value.46 A great majority of jurisdictions hold that
such evidence is admissible if the conditions surrounding the sale
are similar and if the sale of the comparable property was neither
too remote in time nor of such a character as to indicate that it
did not represent the true value of the property4
Those jurisdictions which exclude evidence of comparable sales justify it by stat441d. at 78, 214 N.E.2d at 91.
45
Thus, in Nicols v. City of Cleveland, 104 Ohio St. 19, 135 N.E. 291 (1922) the
court stated in a headnote that
where one entire plan has been adopted for a public improvement and from
the inception a certain tract of land has been actually included therein, the
owner of such tract in a condemnation proceeding therefor is not entitled to
an increased value which may result from the improvement, where its appropriation is a condition precedent to the existence of the improvement.
46
See Annot, 85 A.LR.2d 113 (1962); 5 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 21.3
and cases cited therein for a discussion of both views.
47 Ibid. Thus, in United States v. 329.05 Acres of Land, 156 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) the court, in explaining the majority view, stated:
Sales of the same property or those of a comparable character in the
same neighborhood in recent times constitute the best evidence upon which
to establish value in a condemnation proceeding.
Nonetheless, no one sale can be conclusive since almost every piece of
land is different from every other piece of land in its particular characteristics. All that we can do is study several sales, note the dates thereof and
the types of land involved, and arrive at some figure which makes allowances
for such differences as are apparent. Id. at 71. (Citations omitted.)
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ing that such evidence introduces a multitude of collateral issues
which tend to mislead the jury and consume unnecessary time.48
The basic theory of the comparable sale approach is that evidence of what a "real" purchaser paid for a parcel of property on a
certain date and under certain conditions may support a logical inference that, had a similar piece of property been offered at the
same time, a similar price could have been obtained.49 As the number of sales increase, the probability approaches almost certainty as
to the price that could be obtained. Thus, the court or jury is enabled to reason by comparison as to how much an "ordinarily prudent businessman" would pay, and how much an owner who is
"willing but not obliged to sell" would accept as of a certain date
for the property being condemned." The fallacy of the comparable sales approach is that since no two parcels of real estate are
exactly alike, it would be impossible to find a parcel of real estate
which is identical to the parcel of property that is being condemned.
However, there may be enough similarities to enable the court to
make a reasonable comparison. One writer has stated that
whether such evidence shall be admitted does not depend upon
any fundamental principle of the law of evidence, but is purely a
practical one, depending upon whether there is a net gain or loss
to the orderly and expeditious administration of justice... by the
use of such evidence.81
Since the trial court possesses broad discretionary powers as to
the admission or exclusion of value evidence, 2 it is necessary to
enunciate the guidelines of comparison which the appellate courts
have adopted in determining whether the trial court has abused its
discretion when admitting or excluding evidence of comparable
sales. In Director of Highways v. Bennett,"8 the court indicated
that as a prerequisite to introducing a comparable sale, a party must
show such sale was fair and voluntary; 4 that the properties were
48

See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
Hershman, Compensation - Just and Unjust: A Study in Eminent Domain,
21 Bus. LAw. 285, 309 (1966).
so ibid.
515 NiCHOLS, EMiNENT DOMAIN § 21.3[13 (3d ed. 1964).
52 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
55 118 Ohio App. 207, 193 N.E.2d 702 (1962).
8
r In Naftzger v. State, 24 Ohio App. 183, 156 NE. 614 (1927), the court stated
that "sales by sheriffs and sales that are in the nature of a compromise, or are affected
by an element which does not enter into similar transactions made in the ordinary
course of business, not being a fair criterion of value, are not admissible in evidence."
Id. at 185, 156 N.E. at 615.
49
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similar in their geographic proximity, size, and use;" and that the
time of such sale was reasonably near the time of valuing the condemned property.5 6 Although the appellate courts have formulated
these necessary guidelines, they have stated that the guidelines
should be determined by the trial court, and in the absence of an

abuse of
discretion, the trial court's determination will not be dis57

turbed.
There appears to be a conflict as to whether a comparable sale
is admissible on direct examination or only on cross-examination.
In the 1904 case of Cincinnati v.Eversman,6 an Ohio common
pleas court held that similar sales were admissible on direct examination since they often provided safe guides in determining market
value. 9 However, in Cleveland T. & V. Ry. v. Gorsuch, ° it was
held objectionable to ask a witness as to the general selling price
of lands in the neighborhood within a comparatively short time.
The circuit court reversed stating that evidence of the general selling price of land is admissible but that evidence of prices in particular sales is inadmissible.6 1 The Gorsuch case thus appears to
stand for the proposition that a witness may testify as to the general selling price of lands in the neighborood on direct examination
but is not permitted to specifically state the selling price of a particular piece of property.
In Muccino v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd." the court, recognizing the
conflict, stated that "neither of these rules permits a witness, upon
direct examination, to state what 'the general selling price of land
in the neighborhood' is."6 Therefore, the Muccino case does not
5
5See generally Hershman, supra note 49, at 310-15 for a well-documented discussion of the criteria of similarity. See also Knollman v. United States, 214 F.2d 106

(6th Cir. 1954).
56Ibid.; 118 Ohio App. at 213, 193 N.E.2d at 707. See also Ohio Turnpike
Comm'n v. Ellis, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 NE.2d 391 (1955), appeal dismissed, 352
U.S. 806 (1956); Naftzger v. State, 24 Ohio App. 183, 156 N.E. 614 (1927).
57 E.g., Knollman v. United States, 214 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1954); Ohio Turnpike
Comm'n v. Ellis, supra note 56; Muccino v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd., 33 Ohio App. 102,
168 N.E.752 (1929).
58 4 OHIo L REP. 140 (C.P. 1904).
59 Id, at 147.
60 18 Ohio C.C. Dec. 468, 471 (1905), affd, 76 Ohio St. 609, 81 N.E. 1186

(1907).
61Id. at 472.
62 33 Ohio App. 102, 168 N.E. 752 (1929).
63 Id. at 107, 168 N.E. at 754. See also Naftzger v. State, 24 Ohio App. 183, 184,
156 N.E. 614, 615 (1927), which held that the average price obtained in sales in the
neighborhood was admissible to show the fair market value of the condemned property.
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solve the problem of admissibility on direct examination but does
determine that it is not proper to permit the witness to testify as
to the general selling price of neighboring lands. Although Muccino conflicted with but did not specifically overrule Gorsuch, it
must be remembered that the latter was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court.64 Nevertheless, it appears certain that a witness may
not testify as to the specific selling price of adjacent property on
direct examination. 5 In Cleveland T. & V. Ry. v. Gorsuch,66 it was
held proper to ask an opposing party's witness the selling price of
a particular tract of land because such price does not fix the value,
nor does the time at which such sale was consummated alone determine the present value.6" The court concluded that these elements
are admissible only as tending to show present value.68 Other
courts6" have admitted such evidence on the rationale that the
knowledge of the witness is being tested to help determine the
weight that should be given him as an expert witness as to value.1 0
Although it is thus permissible on cross-examination to inquire
as to the selling price of comparable lands for the purpose of testing the knowledge and competency of the witness, it is prejudicial
error "to incorporate into such inquiries a statement or assumption
that such sales at prices named have in fact occurred."'"
64 Cleveland T. & V. Ry. v. Gorsuch, 76 Ohio St. 609, 81 N.E. 1186 (1907).
6
5 Masheter v. Yake, 9 Ohio App. 2d 327, 329, 224 N.E.2d 540, 542 (1967); Muccino v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd., 33 Ohio App. 102, 168 N.E. 752 (1929); Naftzger v.
State, 24 Ohio App. 183, 156 N.E. 614 (1927); Cleveland T. & V. Ry. v. Gorsuch, 18
Ohio C.C. Dec. 468, 472 (1905), af/'d, 76 Ohio St. 609, 81 N.E. 1186 (1907).
In De Rose v. Cleveland, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 176 (Ct. App. 1933), the court
asserted that while there has been some confusion among the courts and authorities the better rule adopted by the Ohio courts is that a witness called as
to values of real estate, after being qualified as an expert, may state in his
direct examination in chief that he is acquainted with the values of real estate in the vicinity of the property in litigation and that he knows the sale
price of specific parcels or tracts of similar quality and location, but he cannot
testify in chief what those sale prices were. Id. at 178. (Emphasis added.)
66 18 Ohio C.C. Dec. 468 (1905), a'd,76 Ohio St. 609, 81 N.E. 1186 (1907).

67 Id. at 472.
68 Ibid.

69 W. M. Southern Realty Co. v. Schmidt, 3 Ohio App. 70 (1914).
70 d. at 75. In Muccino v. Baltimore & Ohio Rd., 33 Ohio App. 102, 168 N.E.
752 (1929), the court, in justifying the rule, stated: "Each party has an opportunity on
cross-examination to develop all competent evidence as to other sales for the purpose
of determining the weight to be given to the opinions of the witnesses as to value, and
usually the ends of justice will be best promoted by confining the parties to such a
course." Id. at 105, 168 N.E. at 753.
71 Masheter v. Yake, 9 Ohio App. 2d 327, 330, 224 N.E.2d 540, 542 (1967), where
the witness was asked the following question: "'Do you have any record of recent sale
from Jessie Wyantt to Ed Barringer - the second house east of the old church which
sold for $10,600.00, within the last three weeks?'" In holding that the admission of
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It is also interesting to note that it is improper to illicit on
cross-examination the price paid for neighboring lands that have
been previously taken in other condemnation proceedings."2 In rejecting such evidence, it has been stated:
A negotiated sale to the state of Ohio of land to be used for highway right of way is not a voluntary sale, for the state has to have
the land and the seller has to sell or undergo proceedings in eminent domain. The price resulting has no direct relation to fair
market value and does not constitute proof thereof.7 3
The reason for the rule seems to be that if the price were admissible, the jury might construe such price as the fair market value
of the condemned land, when in fact the condemning authority
may have been willing to pay more than the true value of the land
in order to avoid litigation.7'
It is submitted that the court could curb this fear in its phrasing
of the instructions to the jury and that such prices should be admissible, not for the purpose of setting a floor or ceiling as to the property's valuation, but as simply another aid to the jury in arriving at
the fair market value of the condemned property.
Similarly, it seems that the selling price of comparable lands
should be admissible on direct examination, since the reason for
using the comparable sale approach is to show that such land is
similar to the condemned land and that this similar land is valued
at or was purchased for a certain monetary amount, such amount
tending to show the present market value of the appropriated property. The reasoning of the Ohio courts in refusing to allow a witness to testify on direct examination as to the specific selling price
of a comparable piece of property is tenuous, particularly since opposing counsel always has the opportunity to cross-examine the
such question was prejudicial error, the court stated: "[We hold that the trial court
committed error ...[in permitting] the questions of the owner's counsel, which assumed
comparable sales at stated prices when such sales had not been previously testified to
and no proper foundation had been laid to show the sales comparable." Ibid. See also
Morison v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio C.C. Dec. 215 (1911).
72
Masheter v. Yake, supra note 71, at 329, 224 NLE.2d at 541-42.
7a Id. at 329, 224 NX.E.2d at 542. Further, in Naftzger v. State, 24 Ohio App. 183,
156 N.E. 614 (1927), the court stated:
What the party condemning has paid for other property is generally held
to be incompetent. In most such cases the party "must have the particular
property, even if it costs more than its true value. The fear of one party or
the other to take the risk of legal proceedings ordinarily results in the one
party paying more or the other taking less than is considered to be the fair
market value of the property. For these reasons such sales would not seem
to be competent evidence of value in any case, whether in a proceeding by the
same condemning party or otherwise." Id. at 185, 156 N.E at 615.
74 Ibid.
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witness in order to discredit his credibility and competency. Such
inadmissibility only results in the jury's being deprived of a valuable aid in their attempt to find the fair market value of the appro-

priated property.
B. PriorSales of the Condemned Property
In Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Mattevi,78 a court of
appeals held that evidence of a prior selling price for property which
is the subject of an appropriation proceeding is admissible if the
following conditions are satisfied:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

The sale must be bona fide.
The sale must be voluntary, not forced.
The sale must have occurred relevantly in point of time; and
The sale must cover substantially the same property which is
the subject of the appropriation action.76

Further, in Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Ellis,77 the Supreme Court
of Ohio held that the admissibility of the price paid by the owner
of the property is within the sound discretion of the trial court.7"
It appears that the most important of the above factors is the
time period between the date the owner purchased the property and
the date such property was taken in eminent domain."9 Thus, in
Mattevi the appellate court held that the trial court exercised sound
discretion in excluding the price which the defendants had paid for
their land nine years before the condemnation proceeding."
However, it must be noted that, even if admissible, such price does not
fix the present value of the property but is only admitted as tending to show present value.8 '
Although some jurisdictions hold that bona fide offers to purchase the appropriated property are admissible as tending to show
the present value of the land, 2 the Ohio courts have rejected such
75144 NB.2d 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
76Id. at 126.
77164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E.2d 397 (1955), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 806
(1956).
78 Id. at 388, 131 N.X.2d at 406.
79
E.g., Ohio Turnpike Coiram'n v. Ellis, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E.2d 397 (1955),
appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 806 (1956); Tennessee Gas Transmission v. Mattevi, 144
N.E.2d 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956); Naftzger v. State, 24 Ohio App. 183, 156 N.E.
614 (1927).
80 144 N.E.2d at 126.
81
Director of Highways v. Bennett, 118 Ohio App. 207, 213, 193 N.Y.2d 702,
707 (1962).
82
See 5 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 51, § 21.411] and cases cited therein.
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offers as not being competent. 3 The Supreme Court has agreed,
stating that the reason an offer to purchase should not be admissible is that "it is of a nature entirely too uncertain, shadowy and
speculative to form any solid foundation for determining the value
of the land."'
It is submitted that if in the discretion of the trial
court the party seeking to introduce such evidence can show that
the offer was bona fide, that the offeror was reasonable, and that
he could comply with the offer if it were accepted, then an offer to
purchase should be admissible for its probative value. The weight
to be given such offer would then be within the province of the

jury.
Although the Ohio courts reject offers to purchase, it appears that
offers to sell the land by the owner are admissible as possible declarations against interest The Ellis case held that the owner's financial statement which valued the land a good deal lower than he
claimed in the appropriation proceeding was admissible as a declaration or admission against interest bearing on the weight and credibility to be accorded the owner's claim as to the value of his land.85
The case of City of Cleveland v. Grisanti88 emphasized that the
statement must have been made within a relatively short period of
time prior to the appropriation proceeding. There the owner had
made a statement for tax valuation six years earlier. The court
held that such statement was inadmissible as being too remote in
time.8" In any event, the Ohio courts have generally held that the
assessed valuation of property is not evidence of its value for other
than tax purposes.88 However, in Toledo Consol. St. Ry. v.Toledo
Elec. St. Ry.,8" evidence of the tax valuation of the condemned property was admissible as a declaration against interest since the owner
made out the valuation report"° Since Grisanti did not specifically
hold that an owner's declaration concerning the tax valuation of
his property is inadmissible per se, it appears -that the Ohio rule is
that an owner's statement concerning the valuation of his property
88

E .g., Plymouth & Shelby Traction Co. v. Dempsey, 9 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 65 (C.P.
1909).
84

Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1903).
85164 Ohio St. at 382, 131 N.E.2d at 402.
88187 N.E.2d 515 (Ohio Ct App. 1963). See also Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Ellis,
164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E.2d 397 (1955), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 806 (1956).
87 187 N.X.2d at 517.
88
E.g., Bana v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 76 N.E.2c1 625, 628 (Ohio Ct. App.
1947); Cindnnati So. Ry. v. Banning, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 259 (Ct App. 1922).
89 5 Ohio CC. Dec. 643 (1893).

90Id, at 654-55.
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for tax purposes may be admissible as an admission against interest
in a subsequent condemnation proceeding. However, if the owner
neither participated in fixing the assessed tax valuation nor made
any written requests or declarations concerning such valuation, then
the assessed tax valuation of the condemned property is inadmissible to show the present value of such property. Further, it appears that, in Ohio, offers to sell are admissible as an admission
against interest if in the sound discretion of the trial court the date
of such admissions was not so remote in time as to materially destroy their evidentiary value. 1
C. Income Valuation
Another method which has been used to determine the market
value of revenue-producing property is the capitalization of the income derived from such property. " The income approach to valuation is a mathematical process for converting present and future
rents into capital value which is computed by direct, indirect, or
residual methods." Generally, the courts make a sharp distinction
between the income from the business conducted on the real estate
and the income which is attributable solely or primarily to the use
of the property itself.", Therefore, the attorney is confronted with
allocating the profits from the land between these two sources.
In Sowers v. Schaeffer 5 the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
profits derived from businesses conducted on the premises are inadmissible since "such profits are too speculative, depending as they
do upon the acumen and skill of the one who carries on the business."9 6 Losses resulting from inconvenience, interference with
business, and loss of goodwill or anticipated future profits have also
been found inadmissible." Therefore, the Ohio rule appears to be
that evidence as to a loss of income is inadmissible where such in91 See cases cited notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
92

See generally Comment, 43 NEB. L. REv. 137 (1964) for a discussion as to how
income valuation is computed. See also 5 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 51, ch. XIX;
Hershman, Compensation - Just and Unjust: A Study in Eminent Domain, 21 Bus.
LAW. 285 (1966).
93 Ibid.
94

See notes 95-98 infra and accompanying text.

155 Ohio St. 454, 99 N.E.2d 313 (1951).
961d. at 459, 99 N.E.2d at 317. See also Preston v. Stover Leslie Flying Serv.,
Inc., 174 Ohio St. 441, 190 N.E.2d 446 (1963); Cleveland Boat Serv., Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 165 Ohio St 429, 136 N.E.2d 274 (1956).
9
7 City of Bellevue v. Stedman, 63 Ohio App. 150, 154-56, 25 N.E.2d 695, 69798 (1939).
95
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come is derived from a business conducted on the premises and dependent upon the managerial skills of the particular businessman
or if the lost income is occasioned by the appropriation of the particular business by the condemnor. However, absent the above
factors, evidence of such profits is admissible as tending to show the
value of the property. 8
Thus, it has been held that "rental value" is one of the elements
to be considered in fixing the fair market value of the property and
that evidence as to existing rents is admissible." The court justified the admission of such rentals by stating that "a prospective
purchaser of rental property is certain to be interested in established
rentals as evidence of value. The jury should not be deprived of
similar assistance.""' However, in other cases, the Ohio courts
have held that probable rents, that is, rents that would be derived
if the property were used in a certain manner, are inadmissible as
being contingent and speculative."' 1 Furthermore, evidence of the
rental value of property similar to that being appropriated is also
inadmissible.'02 Therefore, only the existing rental value of the
property is admissible, and neither the probable rental value nor
the rental value of similar property are inadmissible, seemingly because an ordinarily prudent businessman would not consider these
if he were purchasing the condemned property. However, it is submitted that an ordinarily prudent businessman would consider probable and similar rentals and would also consider the profits of a
business conducted on the condemned land if he were purchasing
such land. Therefore, should not such profits be also admissible
as tending to show the present value of the appropriated land? It
is submitted that such profits should be admissible within the sound
discretion of the trial court, considering such factors as the nature
of the business and the degree of customer contact with the owners
of such business.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the changing needs of society demand an increase in the
9
8E.g., Avondale v. Cincinnati & Avondale Turnpike Co., 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint
82 (C.P. 1884); City of Cincinnati v. Scarborough, 6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 874 (Dist.
Ct. 1880).
99 I fe Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes, 109 Ohio App. 6, 10,
163 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1959).
100Tbid. See also State v. Linder, 111 Ohio App. 146, 165 N.E.2d 460 (1959).
101 B.g., Powers v. Hazelton & L Ry., 33 Ohio St. 429,434 (1878).
102 Cincinnati So. Ry. v. Banning, 12 Ohio L Abs. 259, 260 (Ct App. 1922).
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governmental appropriation of private property, it is certain that
there will be a corresponding increase in the already-voluminous
condemnation proceedings. In such a proceeding, the court is faced
with the difficult task of insuring that the condemnee is justly compensated. In other words, the function of the courts is to insure
that the condemnee receives the fair market value of his land. Although the Ohio reviewing courts have formulated certain legal
guidelines, the admission or exclusion of valuation evidence rests
upon the sound discretion of the trial court.
This Note has discussed those items of evidence which the Ohio
courts generally deem to be either admissible or inadmissible as
tending to show the present market value of appropriated property
and has analyzed the reasons for such admission or exclusion.
However, the competency of the evidence cannot extend beyond
the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and the admissibility of such evidence is dependent upon the attorney's ability to
convince the court that such evidence is competent to assist the jury
in ascertaining the fair market value of the property.
The possibility of legislative intervention as to the admissibility
of elements of valuation is both undesirable and highly unlikely.
Thus, any reform in the present Ohio valuation methods must necessarily result from the imagination, preparation, skill, and ability
with which the evidence is presented. This process offers the greatest probability of the condemnee's receiving the just compensation
to which he is constitutionally entitled.
JOSEPH PAUL VALENTINO

